Industry Guidelines For The Security Of The Transport Of Dangerous Goods By Road

December 2016

Page

Introduction
- 3
Guidelines
- 6
Annex I
- Technical options for securing temporary storage areas
- 24
Annex II
- Management routines and operating practices for reducing the security risk
- 31
Annex III
- Technical options for preventing the theft of, or interference with vehicles or loads during transport operations
- 33
Annex IV
- Company security plan template
- 39

The first edition of this document was in April 2005, revised in August 2010, in January 2013 and January 2015(*). The current revised Guidelines are in line with ADR 2017 and as subsequently amended.

Disclaimer

This document is intended for information only and sets out guidelines for the security of the transport of dangerous goods by road. The information contained in these Guidelines is provided in good faith and, while it is accurate as far as the authors are aware, no representations or warranties are made about its completeness. It is not intended to be a comprehensive guide to all detailed aspects of the security of the transport of dangerous goods by road. No responsibility will be assumed by the authors in relation to the information contained in these Guidelines.

(*) Note: New text with regard to the previous version of January 2015 is in green

INTRODUCTION

Following the events of September 11 2001 international legislators considered it necessary to develop and implement measures regarding security for the transport of goods by road, rail and inland waterways against possible terrorist risks. Furthermore recent events in Europe have reinforced the need for transport security regulations and vigilance.

On the basis of relevant UN recommendations security provisions – as opposed to classic safety provisions – were listed in ADR Chapter 1.10 and address all parties involved in the transport chain.

These measures took effect on January 1st, 2005 and had to be implemented at the end of the usual 6-months transition period on July 1st, 2005. Since then a limited number of amendments have been adopted and have been incorporated into an updated version of these Guidelines in 2010, aligning them to ADR 2011. In ADR 2013 the requirements for high consequence radioactive material were separated from these for high consequence substances of other classes and this was reflected in the 2013 version of these Guidelines, without affecting the guidance itself. The current revised Guidelines are in line with ADR 2017 and as subsequently amended. The aim of the regulations is the minimisation of the risk of misuse of dangerous goods for terrorist purposes through which persons, property or the environment might be endangered. Absolute protection cannot be achieved in the transport of dangerous goods.

Security measures should be an integral part of the safety and quality management system of every company involved with the transport of dangerous goods.

The general requirements of ADR Chapter 1.10 are mandatory. However, the specific ways they are addressed will depend upon the individual circumstances of the undertakings in a particular transport chain and their assessment of the risks and possible outcomes. For example, the measures taken by a company located in a residential area or adjacent to a strategic transport corridor could be very different to one located or operating in open country.

These Guidelines have been designed by industry to provide as comprehensive a range of technical and operational options as possible, from which users can select their optimum mix of options to achieve compliance with the regulatory requirements of Chapter 1.10.

These Guidelines are NOT a prescriptive list of every action a company must take to meet the regulations. Rather it sets out the likely outcomes of a range of possible interventions, whereby the individual comments can only be properly understood in the context of the relevant regulation texts.

These Guidelines are of a voluntary and indicative nature. Companies will need to decide individually how to apply these Guidelines according to their own judgement, as long as their actions are in conformity with the applicable law. In addition, they should be particularly attentive to comply with the legislation applying to data protection/privacy, when conducting actions in this field.

The regulations of chapter 1.10 do not apply to the carriage of limited quantities and quantities below the levels of subsection 1.1.3.6.3 ADR, except for a number of explosives of Class 1 and except for Class 7 excepted packages of UN 2910 and 2911 if the activity level exceeds the A2 value.

It is important to note that in terms of security provisions 1.1.3.6.3 also applies to tank and bulk transport by road vehicles.

Chapter 1.10 is not applicable for certain goods which are listed in chapter 1.10 as high consequence dangerous goods (e.g. Potassium Cyanide, UN 1680, class 6.1, Packing group I) with a quantity limit of 0 Kg per packaging as the levels of subsection 1.1.3.6.3 take precedence over the quantity limits prescribed in chapter 1.10 (except for the substances as already described above).

The quantity limitations refer to each transport unit. This does not prevent the total annual quantity carried or handled by a company being in excess of this limit. This makes sense as any misuse would refer to an individual act of carriage.

If the quantity limits are exceeded, the regulations of 1.10 sections 1.10.1 and 1.10.2 apply. In the case of high consequence dangerous goods, section 1.10.3 also applies.

Section 1.10.3 introduces specific and more onerous special rules for dangerous goods with a higher danger potential, dealing not only with the general misuse and related dangers but specifically with the misuse for terrorist purposes and their potentially serious consequences.

The following flow chart shows the sequence of decisions to be taken (quantity relates to packaged goods as well as to carriage in tanks and bulk containers):

graph TD;
    A[Quantity limits according to 1.1.3.6.3 exceeded?*] -->|No| B[Chapter 1.10 is not applicable]
    A -->|Yes| C[Chapter 1.10, sections 1.10.1 and 1.10.2 are applicable]
    C --> D[High consequence dangerous goods (Table 1.10.3.1.2 and 1.10.3.1.3)?]
    D -->|No| C
    D -->|Yes| E[The complete chapter 1.10, including section 1.10.3, is applicable]

*According to ADR 1.10.4, there is no exemption from Chapter 1.10 for UN Nos. 0029, 0030, 0059, 0065, 0073, 0104, 0237, 0255, 0267, 0288, 0289, 0290, 0360, 0361, 0364, 0365, 0366, 0439, 0440, 0441, 0455, 0456 and 0500, nor for UN 2910 and 2911 if the activity level exceeds the A2 value, irrespective of their limit in 1.1.3.6.3.

GUIDELINES

In these Guidelines the text of the provisions of the ADR Chapter 1.10 is presented in blue characters and has been shaded in blue. It always precedes the relevant comments.

CHAPTER 1.10

SECURITY PROVISIONS

NOTE: For the purposes of this Chapter, security means measures or precautions to be taken to minimise theft or misuse of dangerous goods that may endanger persons, property or the environment.

1.10.1 General provisions

1.10.1.1
All persons engaged in the carriage of dangerous goods shall consider the security requirements for the carriage of dangerous goods set out in this Chapter commensurate with their responsibilities.

Each person involved ought to be aware of the misuse potential of dangerous goods. Everyone has to observe the relevant legislation in accordance with their responsibilities within their company organisation. This applies equally for example to staff of consignors, loaders, carriers, unloaders and consignees.

Reliable and responsible employees are central to making sure that security measures work effectively. Documentary evidence of the background and experience of anyone being recruited should be obtained.

Companies should ensure all employees who are involved with the transport of dangerous goods hold verifiable:

Licences, certificates and operating documents where applicable.
Any necessary work permits, etc.

Applicants should be warned that giving false information, or failing to disclose material information, would be grounds for a refusal to interview or, if employed, dismissal.

In conformity with any applicable national legislation, employers should check the employment record of everyone involved in the transport of dangerous goods on initial recruitment and licences etc. at regular intervals.

The candidate should be asked for the following information:

Full name;
Address;
Date of birth;
National, governmental or other unique personal identifying number where appropriate;
Details of any past criminal convictions (where this is allowed by law);
Full details of references (where applicable).

A continuous record of the applicant's education and employment history should be obtained. In general, information covering the preceding 10 years should be asked for, and as an absolute minimum covering the previous five years.

If possible direct contact should be made with the previous employer(s) to discuss the applicant’s work record and character.
When checking references by phone, the number supplied by the applicant should be checked e.g. from a telephone directory, enquiries service or internet search.
Open references such as 'to whom it may concern' should not be accepted.
Confirmation in writing may be obtained from employers, educational authorities, and so on.
A progress sheet to record all the actions taken should be kept.
The identity should be checked by asking to see a passport, an official photo ID (such as a driving licence incorporating a photograph), utility bills sent to the applicant's address and so on.
In the absence of an identity card a recent photograph of the applicant should be obtained and he/she should sign it in the presence of a company representative.
Driving licences should be checked thoroughly: examine the licence closely for signs of alteration, discolouration or erasure. It should be made sure that the background colours are correct and intact. Stained or damaged licences should raise suspicions and endorsements should be checked for. The licence should be copied and the copy kept on file.

Much of this information can be gathered as part of a well-structured interview.

1.10.1.2
Dangerous goods shall only be offered for carriage to carriers that have been appropriately identified.

No particular actions are required if there is a regular business relationship with the carrier since the identity of the business partner is known. However, there should still be regular auditing of procedures adopted by the company offering dangerous goods for carriage.

When starting a new business relationship the reliability of the partner should be ascertained. Each company has to decide individually on how to proceed with this, for example, based upon their own criteria or using existing systems such as SQAS (Safety and Quality Assessment System), the CDI’s (Chemical Distribution Institute) Marine Packed Cargo scheme (MPC) or the traditional ISO standardisation systems.

Goods may only handed over for carriage if the right to receive the goods has been ascertained by suitable measures.

Contractors

Businesses use contractors or agencies to provide a growing range of services. But contractors may create new vulnerabilities and expose businesses to a greater 'insider' threat than they would face if relying on directly recruited employees. Some contractors or agencies may be less rigorous in their selection procedures than those who use their services would be.

Contractors involved in the transport of dangerous goods should undergo the same pre-employment screening process as new employees. Responsibility for implementing these checks will rest with the supplying company. The user company should ask them to demonstrate, from their records, that they have carried out these checks. If they fail to do so, the employing company should review its working relationship with the contractor. The supplying company should demonstrate compliance with an appropriate code of practice for the screening of personnel.

User companies may sometimes employ large numbers of contractors on a specific project, at a separate site - for example construction of a new process. In these circumstances, user companies may consider reducing their screening procedures, provided that they can prevent the contractors from gaining access to the operating site.

The user company may have to assume responsibility for carrying out the checks on behalf of self-employed contractors.

Companies should consider additional checks or screening of contractors or sub-contractors employed in key positions, such as security guards at site access points.

It is worth establishing whether the contractor or agency is part of a recognised professional organisation which accredits standards in that industry.

Another good practice is to ensure that procedures are in place to confirm that a person sent by a contractor or agency is indeed the individual who turns up.

In the absence of official ID documents, this may be achieved by the following procedures, for example:

Requiring the contractor or agency to provide in advance a photo of the individual, authenticated by them. This can be compared with the person who turns up at the company’s premises before he/she is let in.
Requiring the contractor or agency to provide their own photo ID, this can be checked on each entry.
If directly employed staff are provided with a photo ID, extending this requirement to contract staff. Ideally these passes should be retained between visits. On each visit, the contractor or agency staff member should be compared with their photograph before the pass is handed over.
Having an agreed substitution procedure for contract staff that is temporarily absent. This could include setting out what is acceptable in terms of a temporary replacement, and considering whether to restrict their duties or access.

1.10.1.3
Areas within temporary storage terminals, temporary storage sites, vehicle depots, berthing areas and marshalling yards used for the temporary storage during carriage of dangerous goods shall be properly secured, well lit and, where possible and appropriate, not accessible to the general public.

“Temporary storage” does not, and should not encompass overnight parking or stops en-route. “Parking” is not the same as “storage”.

Areas for the temporary storage during carriage are areas where interruptions of transport are intended and take place regularly (e.g. stops made necessary by the conditions of carriage as well as periods involved in order to change the mode of transport – transhipment as well as stops necessitated by the circumstances of transport). Interruption in this sense is not stopping or parking e.g. at a service area. The regulatory requirements for parking and supervision are defined in ADR section 8.4.

“Properly secured” means those areas where access is controlled by adequate technical or organizational measures (e.g. clear-cut regulations for access by which the access/stay of unauthorized persons is prohibited).

“Well lit” are those areas in particular where a relevant obligation already exists under industrial safety provisions (for workers). Irrespective of this, adequate technical monitoring systems (e.g. infrared systems) may be used.

“Where possible and appropriate, not accessible to the general public” means that access is prohibited especially by organizational measures (e.g. regulations for access for persons and vehicles – also via rail –, no public access roads). In general physical access barriers (e.g. fences) and site patrols are not necessary if unauthorized persons can be clearly identified and kept out by other measures.

Restricting access

Employers can reduce the 'insider' risk by limiting the access individual employees have to key locations, assets and information to that which they need to do their job. This can be done in various ways, depending on the nature of the business. Examples include:

Physically controlling access to locations housing critical plant, high consequence dangerous goods, IT systems or expensive assets.
Protecting business-sensitive information, whether in hard copy (by, for example, locking it up securely) or soft copy (using access controls on IT systems).
Requiring staff to wear photo ID passes at all times.
Controlling or limiting unsupervised access by contract/agency staff to particular areas.
Stopping contract/agency staff from taking personal possessions into sensitive areas.

See Annex I for a list of technical options to secure temporary storage areas.

1.10.1.4
Each member of a vehicle crew shall carry with them means of identification, which includes their photograph, during carriage of dangerous goods.

For this it is recommended not only to ascertain the identities of the crew members of the road vehicle or vessel but also to record at least their names. This may be done for example by entering the respective data into the company-internal checklists for the implementation of section 7.5.1 ADR (see also comments on 1.10.1.5). This measure is primarily intended to prevent unauthorized persons from picking up dangerous goods. Spot checks should also be considered by comparing the information with that provided by the carrier prior to the collection or delivery of the dangerous goods.

1.10.1.5
Safety inspections in accordance with 1.8.1 and 7.5.1.1 shall cover appropriate security measures.

The obligations in accordance with section 7.5.1 ADR are thus extended to security aspects. Suitable measures of the companies for security checks on incoming vehicles before entering company premises might be:

Using random but recorded order numbers for unloading and loading.
Identifying crew by official ID-documents. In this context attention is drawn to the need of strict observance of the requirements of section 8.3.1 ADR (carrying of passengers).
Checking the driver’s qualifications according to road haulage legislation (where applicable).
Identifying vehicles based on vehicle documents.
Checking the loading and unloading documentation as well as the consignee’s address.
Recording of vehicle crew, vehicle, load and destination.

1.10.1.6
The competent authority shall maintain up-to-date registers of all valid training certificates for drivers stipulated in 8.2.1 issued by it or by any recognized organization.

No further guidance is required since this is the duty of the competent authorities.

1.10.2 Security training

1.10.2.1
The training and the refresher training specified in Chapter 1.3 shall also include elements of security awareness. The security refresher